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Northwest Embayment, Waxell Ridge, Chugach Mountains, Alaska 
One of several  massive  landslides  seen in September 1964 by the Arctic  Institute of 
North America  and  American  Geographical  Society  aerial  reconnaissance  group,  working 
under a National Science Foundation grant. This tongue of debris, presumably caused 
by the earthquake of the previous March, is roughly 3 x 6 km. in size and appears to 
have broken off the face to the lower left of the arete where the face is over 1000 m. 
high. A light  dusting of recent  snow  obscures the surface of the debris  which  could  be 
up to 3 m. in thickness. The Bering Glacier lies behind (south) of Waxell Ridge. 
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A T 5:30 P.M. on 27 March 1964 over 52,000 square miles of southcentral Alaska  were  severely  shaken  by  one of the most violent  earthquakes 
recorded (between 8.4 and 8.7 on the Richter scale). Massive land move- 
ments altered elevations and landscapes significantly and generated sea 
waves (tsunamis) of devastating force all along the Gulf of Alaska. The 
town of Valdez was wiped out  and Seward‘s port  devastated;  much of Kodiak 
slumped below high  tide  and  many  smaller  towns  suffered  varying  degrees 
of damage. The main business district and the most exclusive residential 
area  in Anchorage  literally  had  the  ground  pulled  out from under them  and 
the railroad  and  highways  twisted  themselves  into  ruin. 
Against  this  catastrophic  background it was natural to assume that  the 
economy must  have  been  crippled  and the new State’s  struggle  to  achieve 
economic and social progress  dealt  a  staggering blow. The disaster  area con- 
tained an estimated 60 per cent of the total Alaskan population receiving 
over 55 per cent of the State’s  total income. Although the loss of life was 
relatively small, the initial rough estimates of between one-half to three- 
quarters of a billion dollars  property  damage  represented  a  calamity which, 
it could be  assumed, would have  serious effects upon the Alaskan economy 
in  terms of its ability  to  sustain  a  regular flow of income and  employment 
for its citizens. In addition, the  earthquake  struck  at a  time  when  the 1964 
Legislature was arriving  at  agreement  upon  the most critical  budget  since 
statehood. 
Despite  these  initial  forebodings of economic disaster,  by the end of the 
calendar  year  Governor William Egan was able  to  report  that  not  only  was 
the  State government  solvent, but  the general  business  climate  had  improved 
and most economic indicators  plotted  a  continued  upward  trend of economic 
well-being. Much of the  credit  for  this unexpected and relatively “happy 
ending’’ must  be given to the Alaskans, the  federal  government  and  private 
institutions  for their response  to the disaster.  Existing agencies were  in action 
almost  immediately  during the emergency period. On 2 April 1964 President 
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Johnson  established the  Federal  Reconstruction  and Development Planning 
Commission for Alaska with Senator Clinton Anderson as Chairman and 
membership representing his cabinet, to coordinate the planning and im- 
plementation of reconstruction following the emergency period. When the 
Commission’s major responsibilities had been discharged, it was replaced 
on 2 October by  the  Federal Development Planning  Committee  for  Alaska 
to continue the coordination of the longer-run  development  planning looking 
“beyond the immediate catastrophe toward providing a firm base for re- 
building an even better Alaska.’’ 
The economic impact of the disaster was different  from  what  had  been 
expected,  because of the form  and nature of the  property  damage  and  the 
unusual character of contemporary Alaskan economy. The final official 
estimates of property  damage  were  reduced  to $311 million (not including 
personal  property  loss),  more than  three-quarters of which  was  in the public 
sector of the economy.  Most of the public  property loss was federally-owned 
or controlled, or is being restored in whole or large  part  by  federal  funds. 
Within the  private  sector  the  burden of reconstruction was eased by  generous 
federal  aid  to  private  individuals  and  groups  in  the  form of loans on favour- 
able  terms, forgiveness or adjustments of outstanding  mortgages  and  other 
obligations, tax  adjustments, etc. Thus  the cost to Alaskans of rebuilding  and 
ricovery was considerably lower than the total damage estimates would 
suggest, and  did not require large reallocation of local economic resources 
to accomplish. The job was undertaken  at a  relatively  rapid rate  and  without 
any great drop in local expenditures for current consumption or private 
building. 
Since the 1940’s more than half the employment of and  personal income 
received by  Alaskans has been from wage and  salary employment  directly 
in civilian and  military  government agencies. This does not  include  all the 
employment in so-called “private  industries” which exist solely or primarily 
to serve government programs. Manufacturing  and natural  resource  extrac- 
tive  activities  consequently play an abnormally low role in the  total economy. 
In 1962, for  example, only 8.5 per  cent of total employment came  from  these 
activities in Alaska  as compared with 30.4 per  cent of total employment for 
the United States as a whole. Furthermore, timber, petroleum and other 
mineral resources and industries were unaffected by the disaster. Only a 
portion of the fisheries industry was directly affected and it was able to 
recover in time  to  participate  in  the  large 1964 salmon runs  and  maintain 
the king crab take. 
For these  reasons, there was  no  problem of having to  restore  industrial 
plants  before the Alaskan economy could function  again,  as would have  been 
the case had  it  been  more  mature  and  balanced.  Instead,  as  the economy had 
been  based  primarily  upon the continuing  import of funds  from  outside  the 
State via the  federal government, it shifted  back  into  operation  as soon as 
reconstruction funds  were made available. 
Many individual  Alaskans  and some communities suffered  severe eco- 
nomic hardship, but on the whole there appears to have been an overall 
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increase in employment  and economic activity. Representative was the 
experience of the Anchorage  labour  market.  Construction employment 
increased 55.5 per cent in  April over  March 1964, a  level 72 per  cent above 
the corresponding  month in 1963. Following the emergency  period  construc- 
tion employment continued at higher levels and by November 1964 was 
recorded at 81 per cent  above November 1963 as  reconstruction got into  full 
swing. Civilian government employment rose significantly, if less spectacu- 
larly. Trades, services, communications, and other dependent industries 
initially fell below their corresponding 1963 levels due to destruction of 
business  establishments  and  transportation facilities, but  by  July  and 
thereafter had risen above the corresponding 1963 levels as “business as 
usual’’ was once more possible. 
On a  relatively  small scale, therefore, the economic impact of the 
disaster and its aftermaths during the year 1964 had been comparable to 
the sort of “shot in the arm” from successive replacements of defence 
facilities that  has  kept  the Alaskan economy alive for the past two decades. 
Intelligent  planning  and  scheduling of the reconstruction  appears to  assure 
the spreading of this beneficial effect over two or more years. 
At the very most, however, this will only be a short-run effect. The 
recent past has demonstrated that economic activity engendered by such 
federal  spending is not self-sustaining beyond the specific program or project 
for which the expenditure is made. In Alaska construction generates no 
pump-priming effects as it does elsewhere (all equipment and most mate- 
rials must be imported) and any decrease in its activity is immediately 
translated  into  the social and economic costs associated with  unemployment. 
For this reason, most Alaskans recognize that the defence-construction 
economy must  be supplemented  and increasingly replaced  by an expanding 
natural resources economy. 
Of greater importance than the short-run effects, therefore, is the 
possible impact of the 1964 Good Friday disaster  upon the long-run  process 
of Alaska’s economic  development. This  is of course  more difficult to 
determine. 
When the memory of the terror was  fresher, it was  thought  that popular 
awareness of the  natural hazards  represented  by  earthquakes  and seismic 
waves could have adverse effects upon future plans to live and invest in 
Alaska. It also appeared that the destruction of private property could 
increase mobility of Alaska’s population through the release of the indi- 
vidual  from the ties of fixed equity  in Alaska. But  after  the passage of less 
than a  year, most of the damaged  communities were  substantially  restored 
to  their pre-disaster condition with only a  few concessions to knowledge of 
the hazard - the relocation of the town of Valdez and portions of other 
coastal communities and shore-based facilities to  safer  ground  and  attempts 
to  provide soil stabilization in  the main slide area of the City of Anchorage. 
There was  no evidence of changes in  pre-earthquake  investment  and devel- 
opment decisions and  plans, nor  any  major  exodus of population. Construc- 
tion of facilities for further development of the Cook Inlet and Kenai 
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Peninsula petroleum field, for example, continued on schedule. 
It  has been speculated that progress toward statehood in fact as well 
as  in  name  might  be  retarded by the disaster.  Statehood  was  sought origi- 
nally  as  a  means of fostering the transition of the Alaskan economy from  a 
federal  government  orientation  to  a  self-sustaining locally oriented economy. 
On the eve of the projected full fiscal independence from direct federal 
support of purely  State government  functions,  Alaska  has  been thrust back 
into  a further period of continued  direct  federal  subsidy of its government. 
In addition  to the relief and  reconstruction  funds, the Alaska  Omnibus  Act 
was amended 27 May 1964 to provide  for  continuation of transitional  grants 
to Alaska for State functions until 30 June 1966 and programs of interim 
services  and  facilities by federal agencies were  extended  for  a  similar  period. 
The Federal Development Planning Committees for Alaska established 2 
October 1964 have important planning and policy functions which are to 
be  shared  with  State agencies. If Alaskans  have  overstated  their  real  need 
of relief and if they  shirk  their responsibilities of leadership  and  sharing of 
the costs and  efforts  involved,  these  continuing  programs  will  merely become 
mechanisms by which Alaska  will revert to territorialism in disguised form. 
However, considering all these factors, it appears that, despite the 
frightening  physical  impact of the actual event, the 1964 Good Friday 
earthquake  has had  little  lasting effect upon the Alaskan economy. 
